In his essay ‘Laws and States in Quantum Mechanics’, John Forge presents a case for considering laws of nature to be privileged sets of states, trajectories in the quantum mechanical analogue of phase space. Having presented an argument to show that states have to be taken with full ontological seriousness, Forge then uses those states to undergird his favourite account of laws and explanation — called the Instance View. On this view laws are a special sort of pattern, (...) a certain kind of regularity, and explanations are instances of these regularities (so that you explain some phenomenon A by indicating that it is an instance of some regularity R). Forge then uses this account of laws and explanation to urge the acceptance of van Fraassen’s Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. (shrink)

Summary In a noteworthy new study, Richard Velkley brings together Martin Heidegger and Leo Strauss as part of a reexamination of the foundations and nature of philosophical questioning. In what follows, I critically reflect on this shared search for foundations, and particularly on the role of Plato in Strauss's effort to forge a new path for philosophy which moves away from Heidegger without losing sight of him.

This paper is about structuralism as a form of reconstructing theories, associated with the work Sneed, Balzar and Moulines among others, and not about "structuralism" is any of its other manifold senses. The paper is a reflection in that it looks back on some earlier work of my own on the subject of structuralism and explanation, in which I argued that structuralism and my 'instance view' of explanation go well together, with structuralism providing the means to develop the idea of (...) a theoretical instance. Bartelborth has suggested a view that has some similarity with my early ideas, so I reflect on those as well. I suggest, in opposition to both positions, that a causal account of explanation might also sit well with structuralism. This paper will appear in a special edition of Synthese edited by Moulines and devoted to structuralism themes. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show how moral imagination can be cultivated through meditation. Moral imagination was conceived as a three-stage process of ethical development. The first stage is reproductive imagination, that involves attaining awareness of the contextual factors that affect perception of a moral problem. The second stage, productive imagination, consists of reframing the problem from different perspectives. The third stage, creative imagination, entails developing morally acceptable alternatives to solve the ethical problem. This article contends that moral (...) imagination can be cultivated through three kinds of meditation: non-discursive, semidiscursive, and discursive meditation. Part one shows how the seed of reproductive moral imagination is planted during sessions of nondiscursive meditation. Productive moral imagination, as will be shown in part two, is nurtured through semidiscursive meditation. Part three will demonstrate the flowering of creative moral imagination through discursive meditation. Reflection and small group discussion on each form of meditation will help to show business people how to cultivate moral imagination. (shrink)

While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research, technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities and willingness to (...) make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three ‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks. (shrink)

When Fat Boy, the first atomic bomb was detonated at Los Alamos, New Mexico in 1945, moral responsibility in science was forever thrust into the forefront of philosophical debate. The culmination of the famed Manhattan Project, which employed many of the world's best scientific minds, was a singular event that signaled a new age of science for power and profit and the monumental responsibility that these actions entailed. Today, the drive for technological advances in areas such as pharmaceuticals, biosciences, communications, (...) and the defense industry channels the vast majority of scientific endeavor into applied research. In _The Responsible Scientist,_ John Forge examines the challenges of social, moral, and legal responsibility faced by today's scientists. Focusing on moral responsibility, Forge argues that scientists have a responsibility not to do work that has harmful outcomes and that they are encouraged to do work that prevents harm. Scientists also have a backward-looking responsibility, whereby they must prevent wrongful outcomes and omissions that they are in a position to foresee. Forge presents a broad overview of many areas of scientific endeavor, citing the responsibility of corporations, employees, and groups of scientists as judged by the values of science and society's appraisals of actions and outcomes. He maintains that ultimate responsibility lies in the hands of the individual-the responsible scientist-who must exhibit the diligence and foresight to anticipate the use and abuse of his or her work. (shrink)

In his new book What is a Law of Nature?, David Armstrong gives an account of functional laws on the basis of the theory, originally proposed independently by Armstrong himself, Dretske, and Tooley, and further developed in this work, which asserts that laws are relations of necessitation between properties. On the theory, properties and relations are universals, and so a law is a relation between universals and is itself a universal. There are two reasons why Armstrong's account of functional laws (...) is worth discussing. First, any theory that purports to be about laws that are investigated by science–I assume that we are only interested in such theories–must cover functional laws and not merely be adequate for generalizations about ravens or grue. Second, Armstrong claims that the main rival to his theory, the regularity theory of laws, cannot give a satisfactory account of functional laws. If this is true, and if Armstrong's theory can provide a satisfactory account of functional laws, then this may incline us towards his point of view. (shrink)

'Explanation, Quantity and Law' is a sustained elaboration and defence of a theory of explanation, called the instance view, that is able to deal with the characteristic aspects of physical science, such as the use of mathematics, the fact that errors of measurement are ubiquitous, and so forth. The book begins with a summary of 'new directions' in the theory of explanation and continues with a systematic account of the view that to explain is to show that something is an (...) instance of a law of nature. This embraces topics such as the following - Salmon’s casual-mechanistic account and the ontic conception of explanation; theories of quantity from Ellis to Bigelow-Pargetter to quantum mechanics; Armstrong on numerical laws and laws of nature as relations between quantities; explanation and the quantum state. (shrink)

The institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour began comparatively earl- though not always under that name - in the Australasian region. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appoint ments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and 1960s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments (...) at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of Wollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia and in New Zealand. "Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science" aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. Papers address general issues, however, rather than local ones; parochial topics are avoided. Further more, though in each volume a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand, contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out. Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encour aged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. (shrink)

An account of physical explanation derived from the instance view of scientific explanation is outlined, and it is shown that this account does not cover explanations by theories which contain theoretical functions. An alternative account, also derived from the instance view, is proposed on the basis of Sneed's account of theories. It is shown that this account does cover theoretical explanations. Finally, it is shown that this account can accommodate explananda that record errors of measurement.

The aim of this paper is to give an account of theoreticity which captures the preanalytic conception of a theoretical function, which is precise and yet which expresses what is significant about theoretical functions. The point of departure for this account is a recent discussion of the topic by Balzer and Moulines. On the basis of criticism of this discussion and on the basis of an examination of laboratory measurement, an account of theoreticity is proposed.

Eighteenth-century country gentlemen would carry small amber-coloured reducing lenses on their evening walks, and with their help they would transport themselves from Derbyshire or Kent into the Roman campagna or into the ideal campagna they had learnt from the paintings of Claude or Gaspard Poussin.

The fact that corporate responsibility supervenes on human action implies that there are two possible kinds of account of the former, namely reductive accounts in which the responsibility of the corporation devolves down without remainder to its officers, and those in which it does not. Two versions of the latter are discussed here. The first, due to Peter French, tries to satisfy the supervenience requirement by defining corporate action in terms of human action. It is argued that the corresponding view (...) of intention, intentions as plans, does not serve to show how the defined notion of corporate action also brings with it attributions of responsibility. An alternative account, taking its point of departure from Feinberg’s ideas of vicarious and collective responsibility, is therefore proposed. It is argued that when officers of a corporation substitute the “decision-making mechanism” of the corporation for their own, then responsibility, but not action, can transfer to the corporation. Furthermore, it is argued that this nonreductivist account can be defended against the reductivist charge that attributions of moral responsibility to corporations is a category mistake. (shrink)

The question whether a scientist can be responsible for an outcome of her work which she does not foresee, and so is ignorant of, is addressed. It is argued that ignorance can be a ground for the attribution of responsibility, on condition that there are general principles, rules or norms, that the subject should be aware of. It is maintained that there are such rules which inform the practice of science as a social institution.

This is a challenging book and it addresses important questions. This review has focused on what I think is the most important question of all: just what is the relationship between the ‘strategies’ which drive modern science and the social values which guide the societies we live in. I have much sympathy with the way in which Lacey tries to answer this question and how he tries to open up alternative possibilities and give us a view of the future which (...) is not just a continuing catalogue of environmental disaster ‘for the relief of man's estate’. However, I have expressed doubts as to whether he has been entirely successful in this regard, especially concerning the alternatives to the materialist strategies. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the concept of model as it is applied in the physical sciences, and to show that this analysis is fruitful insofar as it can be used as an acceptable account of the role of models in physical explanation.A realist interpretation of theories is adopted as a point of departure. A distinction between theories and models is drawn on the basis of this interpretation. The relation between model and prototype is (...) expressed in terms of the concepts of access and accessibility, and four conditions are proposed as an analysis of the concept of model. It is concluded that models are introduced when approximate methods are used. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the concept of model as it is applied in the physical sciences, and to show that this analysis is fruitful insofar as it can be used as an acceptable account of the role of models in physical explanation.A realist interpretation of theories is adopted as a point of departure. A distinction between theories and models is drawn on the basis of this interpretation. The relation between model and prototype is (...) expressed in terms of the concepts of access and accessibility, and four conditions are proposed as an analysis of the concept of model. It is concluded that models are introduced when approximate methods are used. (shrink)

This book addresses the morality of engaging in weapons research, a topic that has been neglected but which is extremely important. It is argued that this activity is both morally wrong and morally unjustifiable, and this implies that moral persons should not engage in it. The argument is not based on any pacifist assumptions: it is not assumed that neither individuals nor states should not defend themselves. What is wrong with weapons research is that it is the first step in (...) the production of weapons, weapons are the means to harm, and harming without justification is always wrong. Those who study science, for instance those who are interested in the responsibilities of the scientist, are given a new perspective, while those who are practicing scientists will realize that they should not consider working to design new or improved weapons systems. This book is of interest to students and researchers working in ethics and technology, philosophy of technology, military ethics, and history of technology. (shrink)

ConclusionI think it is clear that Bqm and Oqm are quite different theories, even if they have the same empirical consequences. This is, of course, to adopt something like the realist perspective. Oqm is not normally interpreted realistically by physicists (the survey still has not been done!) but it can be, and what it says things are like is by no means the same as what Bqm says. One of the most puzzling features of Oqm is the status of the (...) particle when it is in an eigenstate of momentum: if it has no precise position how can it be anywhere at all, and if it isn’t anywhere how can it be said to exist? The great advantage of Bqm is that it restores definite trajectories.The books under review, on which I have based this exposition, are all to be recommended. I am particularly impressed with Peter Holland’s book and assure the reader that it will repay study. The collection by Cushinget al. is, on the whole, better than most in that it is consistently focused on the advertised theme, but it is mostly technical. Cushing’s book is the most accessible of the three volumes. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Radical Constructivist Structural Design Education for Large Cohorts of Chinese Learners” by Christiane M. Herr. Upshot: In this comment, I take Herr’s proposition for a constructivist-informed pedagogy for structural design education to extract initial ideas for a framework for a constructivist pedagogy, a framework focused on the decision-making of a constructivist teacher. I enhance this initial framework with initial findings of a study I conducted with a constructivist mathematics teacher.

Philosophers are often interested in explaining significant contrasts between ordinary descriptive discourses, on the one hand, and discourses – such as ethics, mathematics, or mentalistic discourse – that are thought to be more problematic in various ways. But certain strategies for ‘saving the differences’ can make it too difficult to preserve notable similarities across discourses. My own preference is for strategies that ‘save the differences’ without sacrificing logico-semantic continuities or committing to deflationism about truth, but also without embracing either truth-pluralism (...) or global expressivism.I motivate my preference by examining, as a test case, mentalistic discourse. I begin by reconstructing three philosophical puzzles that have led philosophers to think of mentalistic discourse as problematic (Section 2). These puzzles concern the semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical status of contrasts between first-person present-tense attributions – ‘avowals’ – and all other ordinary contingent attributions. I then briefly present my own,neo-expressiviststrategy for addressing the puzzles (Section 3). Unlike traditional ‘simple expressivism’ (which is the analogue in the mentalistic realm of ethical emotivism), neo-expressivism is not committed to avowals’ being non-truth-apt or having non-propositional meanings. And yet it does not require embracing either deflationism about truth or global expressivism. It preserves continuities between mentalistic and other discourses while allowing us to capture discontinuities. Moreover, it is possible to apply the neo-expressivist framework in other areas where the notion of expression is deemed explanatorily useful, as illustrated by consideringethical neo-expressivism(Section 4). In the final section (5), I make more general comments on truth and meaning and tease out some of the commitments of the approach I advocate. (shrink)

The general topic of this book is the theory of categories, its sources, meaning and development. The inquiry can be seen to proceed on two levels. On one, the history of the theory is traced from its alleged genesis in Aristotle, through its main subsequent stages of Kant and Hegel, up to a kind of consummation in two of its prominent twentieth century adherents, Alfred North White head and Nicolai Hartmann. Special attention has been paid to that aspect of the (...) Hegelian conception of the categorial analysis from which the principle of coherence emerged. On the second, deeper level, however, everything starts with Whitehead's metaphysical system, the central part of which con sists of a fascinating, though highly intricate, web of categorial notions and propositions. The historical perspective becomes a means for untangling that web. I am indebted to a number of people for advice, comment and criticism of various parts of this book. My greatest thanks go to my teachers and colleagues Nathan Rotenstreich, Nathan Spiegel, Yaakov Fleischman, as well as to the late Shmuel Hugo Bergman and Pepita Haezrachi. of this book was published in 1967 by An earlier, Hebrew version the Bialik Institute of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Mr Yehoshua Perel, Mr Arnold Schwartz and to my wife Varda for their cooperation in rendering the extensively revised text of the book into readable English. I also owe great appreciation to Miss Liat Dawe for an accurate and painstaking word-processing of the text. (shrink)

In _Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller_ (‘_Voller_’) the Australian High Court held that media companies maintaining Facebook comment pages could be liable for the defamatory posts of commenters on those sites. The decision focussed entirely on whether, by maintaining the Facebook page, the companies had ‘published’ the statements of commenters. Hearings on other aspects of the tort litigation continue. This paper considers the implications of the tort of defamation on public participation on political will formation where, as is (...) increasingly the case, the participation occurs virtually. Australian law has already tackled the law of defamation as a threat to freedom of political communication; _Voller_ continues the jurisprudence by considering whether hosting an online forum for debate amounts to publication. The more recent High Court judgment in _Google LLC v Defteros_ demonstrated the necessity of the law to align the ‘acts’ necessary to found legal action with the new environment of automated search engines. The troubled intersection of dematerialised practices of political and cultural discourse and jurisdictionally bound laws of defamation challenges participatory governance as tribes form and dissolve and shift between geographical interests. Defamation in Australia is a tort of strict liability; and, absenting applicable defences, any participation in communication is sufficient to make that participant a publisher and a party to the defamation. The online environment stretches words across geographical and jurisdictional boundaries, but it also stretches and contorts concepts of fault and responsibility. Participatory digital cultural practices integrating users in the creation of cultural heritage simultaneously draw participants into transgressions, both cultural and legal, which are amplified by the medium. Questions of collective guilt, ‘shades’ of moral responsibility and disproportionality between blameworthiness and legal liability challenge laws formulated for the printing press but now deployed in the online environment. In this way the digitized participatory environment presents deep challenges to law and legal systems, which are chained to geography. This paper considers the concept of innocent publication in the context of the digitized participatory environment and the way in which the virtual experience is dissolving concepts of geographically defined jurisdictions. (shrink)

Comment écrivent les philosophes? répond à une question que tout le monde se pose : la langue du philosophe est-elle spéciale? Sa technicité est-elle de caractère scientifique? Le philosophe fait-il connaître quelque chose? Est-il créateur? L'enquête est menée depuis Kant qui a assigné à la philosophie la tâche de " présenter conceptuellement " les problèmes de connaissance. Si, d'après cette tâche, méthode et écriture font un, le philosophe est aussi un écrivain, mais de quelle sorte? L'activité compositrice à l'aide de (...) concepts éventuellement forgés oriente ici la réflexion. Il en va donc de ce que l'on entend par " concept " avec Frege père d'une conception analytique du concept, puis, second tournant, Wittgenstein. Tel le parricide de Platon contre Parménide, le geste de Wittgenstein est celui d'une redescente de la métaphysique au langage naturel. Il s'ensuit une stratégie d'écriture, le " style-Wittgenstein " (sous-titre), visant à l'autoeffacement de la langue spéciale du philosophe dont Antonia Soulez sonde les conséquences à la lumière du paradigme esthétique de la résonance. (shrink)

Bentham offers a detailed critique of William Blackstone's 'Commentaries on the Laws of England' (1765-9).

Comments on Thi Nguyen’s Games: The Art of Agency, delivered at the 2021 American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting in Montreal.

Cohen begins by defining ‘Color Physicalism’ so that the position is incompatible with Color Relationalism (unlike Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 7, and note 18). Physicalism, in any event, is something of a distraction, since Cohen’s argument from perceptual variation is directed against any view on which minor color misperception is common (Byrne and Hilbert 2004). A typical color primitivist, for example, is equally vulnerable to the argument. Suppose that normal human observers S1 and S2 are viewing a chip C, as (...) in Cohen’s example. C looks unique green to S1, and bluish green to S2. The problem, as Cohen has it, is to explain “what could (metaphysically) make it the case” that S1, say, and not S2, is perceiving C correctly. He purports to find the explanation “extremely hard to imagine”, and so concludes that both S1 and S2 are perceiving C correctly. (That is not the only option, of course: Hardin concludes that neither is perceiving the chip correctly.). (shrink)

Gignac and Zajenkowski (2020) find that “the degree to which people mispredicted their objectively measured intelligence was equal across the whole spectrum of objectively measured intelligence”. This Comment shows that Gignac and Zajenkowski’s (2020) finding of homoscedasticity is likely the result of a recoding choice by the experimenters and does not in fact indicate that the Dunning-Kruger Effect is a mere statistical artifact. Specifically, Gignac and Zajenkowski (2020) recoded test subjects’ responses to a question regarding self-assessed comparative IQ onto a (...) linear IQ scale when a normal IQ scale would likely have been more appropriate. More generally, researchers studying self-assessed intelligence should be aware of potential measurement problems that may arise when transforming an ordinal scale onto an interval scale. (shrink)

L B Daniels; Some Comments on ‘Value in Education’ by Johanna Burgess1, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 237–250, https.